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INTRODUCTION 
What can we learn from current world food trends? Are the production 
trends of the last 30 years likely to continue or are we headed towards the 
fulfillment of Malthus’ predictions? Are we likely to face a future of global food 
surpluses or a future of increasing food scarcity and widespread hunger? How 
will expected surpluses and scarcities be distributed across regions, countries, 
and groups of households and individuals? Are we likely to be faced with 
increasing inequality, poverty, malnutrition, and human misery or will the future 
be bright for all? Will future efforts to meet food needs be sustainable or will 
our natural resources be further degraded? 
The answers depend, not on exogenous factors over which we have no 
control, but on the decisions and actions taken by the major players: 
households, private and public sector agents, governments, and the 
international community. If Malthus turns out to be right, it will be because 
some or all of these players failed to act in an appropriate and timely manner. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to briefly discuss past and 
expected future trends in food consumption and production;3 and second, to 
identify actions needed by the international community to facilitate desirable 
future trends and to modify undesirable trends for the ultimate purpose of 
assisting developing countries to achieve improved and sustainable household 
food security in the future. 
’ Paper prepared for the CGIAR International Centers Week, Washington, D.C., 25-29 
October, 1993. 
2 Director General, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., U.S.A. 
3 For a fuller treatment of this matter, the reader is referred to a report by FAO on food and 
agricultural perspectives to year 2010 to be published shortly. 
2 
FOOD CONSUMPTION AND NUTRITION TRENDS 
Enough food is available in the world today that if it were evenly 
distributed, nobody should have to go hungry. Availability of daily food energy 
per capita in the developing countries as a whole increased by 0.7 percent per 
year during the 1980s (Figure 1). During the 198Os, China and the Far East 
experienced the greatest increases in per capita food availability, while Latin 
America and Africa experienced the smallest increase. 
Twenty-five developing countries were unable to assure sufficient food 
energy (2,200 calories per person per day) for their population at the end of the 
1980s even if available food energy were evenly distributed within each country 
(Figure 2). This is down from 45 countries at the end of the 1970s. Even if 
available food were evenly distributed among residents of each country, about 
half of the African countries would not be able to guarantee sufficient food to 
meet the needs of their populations. 
However, available food is neither evenly distributed nor fully consumed. 
Availability of enough food at global, regional, or national levels does not 
necessarily mean that everybody is well fed. For people to be food secure-that 
Figure l-Estimated annual change in food availability, 1979-1981 to 1988-1990 
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Figure 2- Number of countries with average food availability below 2200 Kcal/person/day, 
1979-81 and 1988-90 
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is, to have access at all times to the food required for a healthy and productive 
life-there must be both availability of food and access to food. Access to food 
by households (and individuals) is conditioned by poverty: the poor usually lack 
adequate means to secure access to food. 
Today, there are over 700 million people who do not have access to 
sufficient food to meet the needs for a healthy and productive life; they often go 
hungry and are insecure when they will have their next meal. Many of these 
hungry adults and children also suffer from diseases of hunger and poverty. 
For almost one-fifth of the total population of developing countries to be 
chronically hungry tarnishes the image that the world is now food secure just 
because it produces enough food. 
Over one billion people in developing countries were living in poverty in 
1985, of whom over 600 million were living in conditions of extreme poverty 
(World Bank 1990). South Asia is the home of about half of the developing 
world’s poor (Figures 3 and 4). Another 25 percent are found in East Asia, 16 
percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 7 percent in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The prevalence of poverty (the proportion of the population that is 
poor) is very high in South Asia as well as Sub-Saharan Africa-around 50 
percent. World Bank projections (1990) indicate that significant reductions 
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Figure 3-Poverty in developing countries (number): The poverty line in 1985 PPP dollars is 
$370 per capita a year 
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Figure 4-Poverty in Developing Countries (percent): The poverty line in 1985 PPP dollars is 
$370 per capita a year 
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could occur in the magnitude and incidence of poverty if efforts are made to 
reduce poverty through engaging in efficient labor-intensive growth and 
providing adequate social services, among other things. The most significant 
reductions are expected to occur in East Asia and South Asia, but in Sub- 
Saharan Africa the numbers of the poor are expected to increase by almost 50 
percent to 265 million in the year 2000. By the end of the decade, it is 
projected that one-third of the developing world’s poor will be found in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, compared to about 16 percent currently. 
Great progress has been made to meet food needs during the last 30 
years. For instance, the number of underfed people4 declined from an 
estimated 976 million in 1974-76 to 786 million in the late 1980s (UN ACC/SCN 
1992). But the problem is far from solved. Moreover, keeping up with 
increasing needs due to population growth, income increases, and dietary 
changes is itself a formidable challenge. 
Hunger and food insecurity have a significant effect on health and nutrition 
of both adults and children. They can lead to growth failure in children. About 
184 million preschool children in developing countries were underweight5 in the 
late 1980s (Table 1 and Figure 5). About half of the underweight children are 
found in South Asia, and another 16 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
prevalence of underweight children is high in South Asia (about 60 percent), but 
it is also significant in Sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia (Table 2). It is 
worrisome that the number of underweight children has risen in recent years, 
from 164 million in 1980. The increase in the number of underweight children 
in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1980s from 19.9 million to 28.2 million is 
particularly striking (Figure 5). Projections by the UN ACC/SCN suggest that 
regardless of whether optimistic or pessimistic scenarios are employed,6 the 
number of underweight children in Sub-Saharan Africa will increase during the 
1990s (Table 1). The situation in South Asia is also rather precarious, with 
almost half of the children still projected to be underweight in the year 2000. 
In addition to energy deficiencies, micronutrient deficiencies are also 
widespread in the developing world. About 14 million preschool children (under 
the age of five years) have eye damage as a result of Vitamin A deficiency (UN 
4 Population of all ages with energy intake on average below 1.54 BMR over one year. 
5 Weight less than -2 Standard Deviations of reference. 
6 The optimistic scenario applies the best observed rate of change over a five-year period 
during 1975-90 to the regional grouping of countries, whereas the pessimistic scenario applies 
the worst five-year rate (UN ACC/SCN 1992). 
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Table l-Number of underweight preschool children’ in developing countries, 1980-2000 
1980 
Number Underweight (mil!ions) 
1990 2000 
Region Pessimistic 
Scenario2 
Optimistic wsc 
Scenario3 Goals4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Near East/N. Africa 
South Asia 
Southeast Asia 
China 
Middle America/ 
Caribbean 
South America 
Global Total 164.0 184.0 206 175 108 
19.9 28.2 38 30 18 
5.0 4.8 5 3 2 
89.9 101.2 110 100 59 
22.8 19.9 17 15 11 
20.5 23.6 30 24 15 
3.1 3.0 4 2 2 
3.1 2.8 2 1 1 
Source: UN ACC/SCN, 1992. 
’ Percent below -2 standard deviations from the mean weight-for-age, zero through five 
years of age. 
2 The pessimistic scenario applies the worst five-year rate of change over a five-year 
period during 1975-90 to the regional grouping of countries. 
3 The optimistic scenario applies the best five-year rate of change over a five-year period 
during 1975-90 to the regional grouping of countries. 
4 Goals for 1990 World Summit for children. 
7 
Table 2-Prevalence of underweight preschool children’ in developing countries, 
1980-2000 
Percent Underweight 
1980 1990 2000 
Region Pessimistic Optimistic wsc 
Scenario* Scenario3 Goals4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Near East/N. Africa 
South Asia 
Southeast Asia 
China 
Middle AmericaJ 
Caribbean 
South America 
Global Total 37.8 34.3 32 27.5 17 
28.9 29.9 32 27 15 
17.2 13.4 11 8 6 
63.7 58.5 54 49 29 
39.1 31.3 24 22 16 
23.8 21.8 22 16 11 
17.7 15.4 16 10 8 
9.3 7.7 6 2.5 4 
Source: UN ACC/SCN, 1992. 
’ Percent below -2 standard deviations from the mean weight-for-age, zero through five 
years of age. 
* The pessimistic scenario applies the worst five-year rate of change over a five-year 
period during 1975-90 to the regional grouping of countries. 
3 The optimistic scenario applies the best five-year rate of change over a five-year period 
during 1975-90 to the regional grouping of countries. 
4 Goals for 1990 World Summit for children. 
Figu Ire 5-Malnutrition among preschool children 
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ACC/SCN 1992). Ten million of these children are found in South East Asia. 
About 250,000 to 500,000 preschool children go blind each year due to Vitamin 
A deficiency, and two-thirds of these children die within months of going blind 
(UN ACWSCN 1992). Many more children are mildly affected. Recent research 
has shown that even mild deficiencies can increase mortality significantly. 
Vitamin A deficiencies are closely linked to diets, which can be influenced by 
agricultural research and policy. 
Iron deficiency affects about one billion people in the world, particularly 
children and reproductive-aged women (UN ACC/SCN 1992). Iron deficiency 
leads to anemia, which if not checked can diminish learning capacity and 
increase morbidity and mortality. In the developing countries, about 370 million 
women aged between 15 and 49 years of age-42 percent of this population 
group-were anemic in the 1980s (Table 3, Figure 6). ’ There are tentative 
indications from South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa that the prevalence of 
anemia is rising in nonpregnant adult women of reproductive ages (Figure 7). 
Anemia partly arises due to diets containing insufficient iron, which again may 
be addressed by agricultural research and policy. One possible reason why 
iron deficiency and anemia are going up in South Asia may be the decrease in 
production of pulses during that same period (Figure 8). Reduction in pulses 
production is in part a reflection of the larger research input into competing 
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Table 3-Prevalence and numbers of anemic women in developing regions 
in the 1980s 
Region Percent Million’ 
Sub-Saharan Africa 42 41 
Near East/North Africa 33 15 
South Asia 64 158 
Southeast Asia 48 57 
China 26 75 
Middle America/Caribbean 28 9 
South America 23 15 
Total 42 370 
Source: UN ACC/SCN, 1992. 
’ Based on population estimates for 1985. 
Figure 6-Prevalence of anemia in women 
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Figure ‘/-Trends in anemia 1977-1987 nonpregnant women 
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Figure 8-Trends in per capita production of pulses, South Asia, 1977-1987 
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crops such as wheat. This raises important questions regarding research 
priorities allocated to yield-increasing research for pulses in South Asia. 
In summary, South Asia is the home of about half of the developing 
world’s hungry and food insecure people, but this population group is growing 
rapidly in Su b-Saharan Africa. Much of the poverty and food insecure is 
concentrated in rural areas, mainly in low-potential areas such as arid zones, 
but urban poverty is growing rapidly. 
FOOD PRODUCTION TRENDS 
Food production increased by 39 percent in developing countries as a 
whole during the 1980s (Figure 9). The food production performance was 
particularly impressive in China and the Far East. Even in Africa, where 
concerns regarding the future food situation are greatest, total food production 
increased by 33 percent during the 1980s. In fact, total food production 
increased during the 1980s in 101 developing countries, with 30 countries 
experiencing increases of 40 percent or more. 
Figure g-Change in total food production, 1979-81 to 1989-91 
(percent) 
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However, total food production increases is only part of the picture. In 
most developing countries, food production increases have barely kept up with 
population increases. During the 198Os, per capita food production increased 
by only 13 percent in the developing countries as a group, with the highest 
increases observed in China and the Far East (Figure 10). In Africa and the 
Near East, per capita food production declined during the decade. In 75 
countries, less food was produced per person at the end of the 1980s than at 
the beginning. Three-fourths of the African countries fell into that category, as 
did 64 percent of the Latin American countries and half of the Asian countries. 
Fifteen countries experienced reductions of 20 percent or more in per capita 
food production during the decade. 
Yield increases were the major source of food production growth in 
developing regions except Africa (Figure 11). Yield increases contributed about 
80 percent of increased cereal production in developing countries as a whole, 
while area expansion contributed about 20 percent. Yield increases in China 
were most impressive and were the only source of China’s spectacular food 
production performance during the 198Os, given that area cultivated under 
cereals actually declined during this decade. Area cultivated under cereals also 
declined in Latin America. In Africa, by contrast, more than half of cereal 
Figure lo-Change in per capita food production, 1979-81 to 1989-91 
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Figure 1 l-Change in area and yields for cereals, 1979-81 to 1989-91 
(percent) 
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production increases during the 1980s came from area expansion. While 
cultivated area is still increasing in developing countries, it is doing so at a low 
and declining rate. Area expansion is no longer a feasible option for expanding 
food production in most of the world, and increased food production in the 
future will have to come from increased yields. 
The most important cereal crops in developing countries are rice, wheat, 
and maize, which account for 50, 23, and 19 percent of all cereal production 
respectively. In Africa, coarse grains are particularly important, with maize, 
sorghum, and millet accounting for 33, 18, and 14 percent of total cereal 
production respectively. Yield increases have been a particularly important 
source of production growth in wheat and rice and, to a lesser extent, maize, 
while they have played a much smaller role for sorghum, roots and tubers, and 
pulses (Figure 12). Yield-expanding technology is vital for enhancing the food 
production capacity of developing countries, especially for Africa. 
Mainly stimulated by the Green Revolution, yields of maize, rice, and 
wheat doubled between 1961 and 1991 in developing countries as a group 
(Figure 13). Yield increases in Asia were notably high, especially for rice and 
wheat (Figure 14). From 0.5 tons per hectare in 1961, wheat yields in Asia 
exceeded 3 tons per hectare in 1991. Steady upward movement of the yield 
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Figure 12-Change in area and yields for selected crops for all developing countries, 
1979-81 to 1989-91 
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trend is clearly observed for the three major cereals. China demonstrates some 
of the most spectacular yield increases observed in the developing world: maize 
yields increased from about 1.2 tons per hectare in 1961 to 4.6 tons in 1991; 
rice yields tripled from 2 to 6 tons per hectare between during this period; and 
wheat yields increased six-fold from 0.5 to 3 tons per hectare during the same 
period (Figure 15; Plucknett 1993). 
Africa, by contrast, demonstrates poor and variable yield performance with 
regard to maize, rice, and wheat (Figure 16). While maize yields in Asia rose 
from 1.2 to 3.4 tons per hectare during 1961-91, maize yields in Africa rose from 
about 0.8 to 1.2 tons per hectare. Wheat yields rose from about 0.5 tons per 
hectare in 1961 to about 1.6 tons in 1991. Note that China and Africa had 
similar yield levels for wheat in 1961 (0.5 tons per hectare), but by 1991 Chinese 
wheat yields were double those of Africa. That Africa haS a long way to go to 
catch up with Asia is painfully obvious. In the past, African farmers have relied 
on bringing new land into cultivation in order to expand production. This has, 
in part, compensated for the slow increases in yields. Continued attempts to 
expand agricultural land will entail increasing financial and ecological costs. 
Thus, as has happened in most of Asia, Africa will have to rely on increased 
yields to meet future food production expansion. 
Figure 13-Trend in yields for all developing countries 
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Figure 14-Trend in yields for Asia 
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Figure 15-Trends in yields for China 
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Figure 16-Trend in yields for Africa 
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In Asia, some troubling signs are evident regarding the yields of the two 
major crops of wheat and rice. The annual rate of yield increases is slowing. 
Rice yields increased rapidly during the 1960s and 197Os, but since then the 
annual rate of yield increase has slowed and the growth rate is now almost 
back at the rate prevailing in the early 1960s. Between the mid-i 970s and early 
198Os, rice yields increased at an annual rate of about 3 percent, but then 
slowed to less than 2 percent during the remainder of the 1980s (Table 4). In 
South East Asia, rice yields have declined by half from an annual rate of 3.2 
percent in the 1970s to 1.6 percent in recent years. Even in China, rice yield 
growth rates have slowed from more than 4 percent per year in the late 1970s 
to about 1.6 percent during the 1980s. Only in India have rice yield growth 
rates increased in recent years. The situation is similar with regard to wheat. 
Yield growth rates have slowed down in Asia as a whole from 4.4 percent in the 
late 1970s to 2.7 percent in the 1980s (Table 5). This trend is observed across 
Asia, with the exception of South East Asia, where yield growth rates increased 
from -0.8 percent in the late 1970s to 2.8 percent in the 1980s. 
In addition to lower rates of increase in yields, the increasing variability in 
total world grain production should be of serious concern (Figure 17). Part of 
the explanation for the increasing variability in cereal production is the increased 
similarity of cereal varieties across areas. 
Table 4-Growth in Asian rice yields (percent per annum) 
1957-59 to 196567 to 1973-75 to 1981-83 to 
1965-67 1973-75 1981-83 1988-90 
Total Asia 1.7 2.3 2.9 1.9 
Southeast Asia 1.5 2.9 3.2 1.6 
South Asia 1.9 1 .o 1.7 2.0 
China 3.2 1.7 4.1 1.6 
India 0.7 2.2 1.6 3.2 
Source: IRRI data analyzed in Rosegrant and Svendsen, 1993. 
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Table 5-Growth in Asian wheat yields (percent per annum) 
1961-63 to 1965-67 to 1973-75 to 1981-83 to 
1965-67 1973-75 1981-83 1988-90 
Total Asia 6.2 4.1 4.4 2.7 
Southeast Asia 0.4 4.6 -0.8 2.8 
South Asia -0.4 5.0 3.2 1.1 
China 11.5 4.3 5.7 2.9 
India 1 .o 4.9 3.5 2.9 
Source: FAO data analyzed in Rosegrant and Svendsen, 1993. 
World grain production per person increased steadily during the 195Os, 
196Os, and 197Os, but recent trends suggest that there has been stagnation 
during the 1980s and early 1990s (Figure 18). Some are arguing that world 
grain production per person is now declining (Brown, Kane, and Ayres 1993). 
In order to get a better view of the trend in the 198Os, we have amplified that 
part of the figure (Figure 19). Based on statistical tests, the trend between 1980 
and 1993 is best represented by a horizontal line. Thus, it appears that the 
world grain production per person has been constant rather than declining 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. The production data for the last two years 
are preliminary, but if they turn out be correct and if the grain production 
performance continue to fall below that of the early 199Os, then we will soon be 
on a statistically significant downward trend of grain production per person. 
The recent stagnation in world grain production per person should be of 
serious concern because factors other than population growth will continue to 
push grain demand upward. It is particularly noteworthy that the demand for 
feed grain increases rapidly with increasing incomes beyond a certain income 
level, as illustrated by Brazil and Indonesia (Figures 20 and 21). While 
projected growth in cereal consumption for food is very close to population 
growth (Figure 22), expected growth in feed grain demand is more than twice 
the expected population growth. Once incomes have increased beyond a 
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Figure 17-Estimated probability of a five-percent shortfall below trends in world grain 
production 
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Figure 18-World grain production per person, 1950-93 
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Figure 19-World grain production per person, 1980-1993 
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Source: FAO. 1992. 
Figure 20-Per capita feedgrain use as function of GDP per capita, Brazil, 1970-1990 
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Figure 21-Per capita feedgrain use as function of GDP per capita, Indonesia, 1970-1990 
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Source: USDA, 1993; World Bank, 1992b. 
certain point, feed grain demand levels off, as demonstrated by Korea (Figure 
23). Most developing countries have incomes that are still below the level 
where the feed grain use increases rapidly or they are in the phase of the steep 
increase in feed grain use. 
Non-cereal staples such as roots, tubers, and plantains are of great 
importance in many regions both in terms of their contribution to total food 
availability and in terms of their importance in the diets and incomes of the 
poor. According to FAO, non-cereals supply 40 percent of total food energy for 
the half of the Sub-Saharan African population with the highest risk of food 
insecurity. Non-cereal staples, notably potatoes and cassava, play a very 
significant role in the diets of the poor also outside Africa, and efforts to 
accelerate yields of those crops in a sustainable manner should be an integral 
part of efforts to reduce food insecurity. 
Food prices are on a long-term downward trend (Figure 24). For the past 
four to five decades-except for a few short periods such as the food crisis of 
the early 1970s-global food supplies have been sufficient to assure that 
international food prices have decreased. Where are food prices headed now? 
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Figure 22-Projected annual growth in cereal consumption for food and feed, 1980-2000 
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Figure 23-Per capita feedgrain use as function of GDP per capita, Korea, 1970-l 990 
Kg/Capita 
GDP/Capita (Constant 1987 Won) 
Source: USDA, 1993; World Bank, 1992b. 
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Figure 24-World food price index, 1970-92 (in constant dollars, 1990 = 100) 
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Source: World Bank. 1993. 
Most recent projections conclude that it is unlikely that real food prices in the 
international market will increase significantly during the rest of the 1990s. 
Much depends on the outcome of the current trade negotiations, 
particularly the Uruguay round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), and on developments in China, India, Eastern Europe, and the former 
Soviet Union. If the GATT negotiations are successful in significantly reducing 
agricultural subsidies and trade distortions in the European Economic 
Communities (EEC), the United States, and Japan, we can expect food price 
increases in the world market. These price increases will vary among 
commodities and will depend on the magnitude and speed of market 
liberalization. However, these are at least three reasons why such price 
increases will be very limited or will not occur at all. First, it now appears that 
any reductions in agricultural trade distortions in the EEC, the United States, 
and Japan are likely to be small and spread out over a long period of time. 
Second, there are strong indications that the negotiations will result in enhanced 
supply management rather than freer markets in these countries, which will 
keep domestic production at higher levels than justified by free markets. Third, 
it is likely that Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union will increase 
agricultural production considerably faster than demand during the next 10 
years. Further reductions in livestock production and consumption in those 
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countries may release significant amounts of feedgrain to the world market. 
This, in turn, is likely to depress international prices. Furthermore, as the effects 
of structural adjustment take hold, the agricultural sector of these countries are 
likely to become much more productive. 
China and India produce about one-third of the world’s cereals and more 
than half of the cereal production of the developing countries. The cereal 
production of these two countries is about 2.5 times the amount traded 
internationally and about twice the current year-end world cereal stock. Thus, 
changes in cereal production or demand in these countries could have major 
effects on international prices and stocks. 
Decreasing real world market prices for food are an outcome of both the 
production performance and food demand. Food needs are represented in the 
world market only if they are matched by purchasing power. Thus, future food 
prices will be influenced by the extent to which the one billion people who 
currently earn one dollar a day or less as well as the 90-100 million people 
added every year will be able to convert their food needs into effective market 
demand. Low and decreasing real food prices in the world market are not 
incompatible with high and increasing poverty, food insecurity, hunger, and 
malnutrition. In fact, the former may be a result of the latter. 
FACTORS INFLUENCING FUTURE FOOD PRODUCTION AND 
CONSUMPTION 
Global and regional food production and consumption during the next 10 
to 20 years will be influenced by a large number of factors. Changes in the 
following four sets of factors are likely to be particularly important: 
1. Economic growth and economic policies, 
2. Population growth and urbanization, 
3. Rural infrastructure, agricultural production technology, and access 
to modern inputs, and 
4. Natural resource management and environmental considerations, 
Each factor is discussed below, with an emphasis on its expected impact 
on future food production and consumption. 
Economic Growth and Economic Policies 
As shown in Table 6 and Figure 25, growth in real per capita income 
during the 1980s was disappointing for developing countries as a whole. 
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However, the low average rate of growth covers large variations among 
regions. The high rates of economic growth in Asia are expected to continue 
through the 199Os, while incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa are expected to keep 
pace with population growth. 
Future economic growth depends on internal policies as well as on the 
international environment. The extent to which current structural adjustment 
and economic reforms in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), Eastern Europe, and selected countries in Asia and 
the Middle East are carried to a successful completion at the appropriate speed 
and sequence is of paramount importance for future economic growth in those 
countries. 
Closely related to this issue is the question of the most appropriate role 
of the state in a market-oriented economy with inappropriate institutions, poor 
infrastructure, and insufficient experience by the private sector in dealing 
effectively in a competitive market environment. Overreaction to past failures 
of excessive and inappropriate state intervention may cause governments to 
take on a passive role where intervention is needed to assure that the markets 
function effectively and to deal with externalities in the economy. 
Table 6-Annual growth in real per capita income, 1980-2000 (percent) 
Reaion 1980-89 1990-2000 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.9 0.3 
East Asia 6.3 5.7 
South Asia 3.1 3.1 
Latin America -0.5 2.2 
Middle East/N. Africa -2.5 1.6 
Developing countries 1.2 2.9 
Source: World Bank, 1992a. 
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Figure 25-Annual growth in real per capita income 
(percent) 
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Source: World Bank, 1992b. 
Future economic growth will also depend on the international trade 
environment, including trade distortions by developed countries, and access to 
external aid. Import restrictions for agricultural and non-agricultural products in 
Japan, the European Common Market, and the United States, along with 
domestic agricultural subsidies and implicit and explicit export subsidies for 
agricultural products are of particular concern. The World Bank (1992a) 
estimates that a 50 percent reduction of the current trade protection by Japan, 
the European Common Market, and the United States would result in an 
increase of US$50 billion in export revenues to developing countries, which is 
roughly equivalent to the total official economic aid from OECD countries to 
developing countries (World Bank 1993). The largest share of this economic 
gain (54 percent) would be captured by the Far East (World Bank 1992a). 
Trade liberalization is an integral part of structural adjustment and 
economic reforms in most developing countries. It is particularly noteworthy 
that historical trends of protection are being replaced by a large degree of 
trade liberalization in many Latin American countries with expected positive 
effects on economic growth. However, the sustainability of Latin America’s 
trade liberalization policies is in danger, because they are not being matched 
by trade liberation in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Failure to achieve 
sizable reductions in agricultural protection in OECD countries and failure to 
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ratify the NAFTA agreement on the part of the United States would make it 
extremely difficult for Latin America to continue its elimination of nontariff 
barriers and large reductions of tariffs. The result will be reduced economic 
growth and increasing unemployment and poverty in the region. 
During the 198Os, government policies in most developing countries were 
dominated by the need to deal with economic crises, including balance of 
payment problems. During the first half of the decade many countries 
attempted to correct balance of payment problems in an unrealistically short 
period of time. Demand-contracting stabilization policies caused severe 
hardships on both the poor and the middle class. Hopefully such stabilization 
policies are a thing of the past. More recently, emphasis has been on supply- 
enhancing structural adjustments and policy reforms. Unfortunately, insufficient 
attention has been paid to adjustments and reforms that improve the 
productivity of the human resource (health, education, and nutrition) and 
enhance access by the poor to productive resources such as land and capital. 
Furthermore, while policy reforms frequently aim at market liberalization and 
privatization and reductions of inefficiencies and rents captured by the public 
sector, much more attention should be given to the removal of distortions in 
input and output markets, asset ownership, and a series of other institutional 
and market distortions that are adverse to the poor. Without such attention, 
existing institutions will continue to be adverse to the poor, and market 
liberalization and privatization are likely to result in rapid accumulations of 
wealth among a small number of people with only limited benefits to the poor. 
Improved human resources and enhanced access by the poor to other 
productive resources will contribute to reduced poverty and food insecurity as 
well as to higher economic growth. Policies that will expand investment in rural 
infrastructure, primary health care, education, agricultural research and 
improved production technology, technical assistance, and credit are urgently 
needed to enhance income earnings, food security, and nutritional status 
among the rural poor and to reduce unit costs of food production for the benefit 
of both rural and urban poor. 
Policies are needed to pursue the triple goal of poverty alleviation, 
increased productivity in food production, and sustainability. No attempts will 
be made to detail such policies here but such a list would include policies to 
improve water management, expand agricultural research, and deal effectively 
with externalities resulting in land degradation and deforestation. In addition, 
policies are needed to protect the rural and urban poor from both chronic and 
transitory food insecurity in the short run. Such policies would include targeted 
food and cash transfers of various types, labor-intensive public works programs, 
and emergency relief. International food aid may play an important role. 
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In the poorest of the developing countries, including virtually all of Sub- 
Saharan Africa, effective population policies focused on family planning and 
reduced rural-urban migration are urgently needed. However, such policies will 
be fully successful only if accompanied by alleviation of poverty and 
improvements in education, primary health care, and nutrition. While investment 
in urban infrastructure, including social infrastructure, must be accelerated to 
accommodate the rapid urban population growth and avoid further expansions 
in urban slums and associated misery, rural development, including enhanced 
income-earning opportunities for the poor and access to primary health care, 
is critical to reduce migration of poor rural residents to urban areas. Provision 
of education in rural areas may accelerate migration but the migrants are less 
likely to end up in slums. 
In low-income developing countries, the agricultural sector is the most 
effective, and frequently the only viable, lead sector for overall economic growth. 
Agricultural growth stimulates economic growth in nonagricultural sectors, which 
in turn results in increased employment and reduced poverty. Unfortunately, 
international financial support to agricultural development has decreased very 
significantly during the 1980s and early 1990s. A recent study shows that real 
external assistance to agriculture in low-income countries declined from $12 
billion in 1980 to $10 billion in 1990, while the share of agriculture in 
development assistance declined from 20 percent in 1980 to 14 percent in 1990 
(von Braun et al. 1993). At the same time, no real advances have been made 
to reduce the negative effects on developing-country agriculture from the 
protection of OECD agriculture. A reversal of the downward trend in 
international support for developing-country agriculture is urgently needed not 
only to assure future food supplies and protect natural resources, but also to 
facilitate general economic growth in low-income developing countries. This is 
also critical for expanding export markets for both agricultural and 
nonagricultural commodities from OECD countries. Preliminary findings from 
on-going IFPRI research indicate that agricultural growth in low-income 
developing countries results in growth in agricultural imports that-in percentage 
terms-exceeds the growth in the agricultural sector. Thus, rather than reducing 
export markets as feared by some farm groups in OECD countries, foreign 
assistance to developing-country agriculture expands these markets. 
Although an economically healthy agricultural sector is usually a 
necessary condition for the alleviation of rural poverty, it is not sufficient. In 
most developing countries, the rural poor derive a large share of their income 
from sources other than agriculture, although some of these income sources 
depend on agriculture directly or indirectly. Furthermore, many of the rural poor 
are net buyers of food. Thus, while policies to stimulate expanded agricultural 
production will be beneficial to some of the rural poor, others will be either 
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unaffected or negatively affected. Policies that increase food prices for the net- 
food buying rural poor are an example of the latter. 
The emphasis should be on low-cost rather than high-cost agriculture. 
Technological change and improved rural infrastructure are among the most 
effective ways to facilitate production expansions at reduced unit-costs. As 
illustrated by the case of wheat in Saudi Arabia (Figure 26), large production 
expansions can be obtained even under very adverse conditions if costs are of 
little concern. As a result of high prices and heavy investments, Saudi Arabia 
increased wheat production from virtually nothing prior to 1980 to more than 
four million tons by 1992. Net imports of more than half a million tons in 1982 
were converted to net exports of almost two million tons in 1991.. 
Population Growth and Urbanization 
According to the United Nations, the current world population of 5.5 
billion will increase to approximately 10 billion by 2050. Although the annual 
growth rate is falling for the world as a whole, the annual population increase 
during the next 20 to 30 years, of slightly less than 100 million people, will be 
the largest ever. Approximately 97 percent of this increase is projected to occur 
in the Third World, with Africa alone accounting for 34 percent of the growth. 
Thus, although the demographic transition has resulted in reductions in annual 
population growth rates in Asia and Latin America, the reductions are insufficient 
to counter the absolute increases (Figure 27). 
The rate of growth is particularly strong in urban areas (Figure 28) and 
it is projected that approximately 44 percent of the population of developing 
countries will reside in urban areas by 2000, up from 22 percent in 1960 and 31 
percent in 1980 (Figure 29). 
Population growth of the magnitudes mentioned above will severely 
constrain efforts by the Third World to improve per capita income and well- 
being, while greatly increasing the need for food and other basic necessities. 
It is unlikely that Sub-Saharan Africa will be able to cope with the large 
population growth without significant increases in poverty and decreases in the 
overall standard of living. Past and current famines in thee region, while blamed 
on droughts, wars, and adverse agricultural policies, are to a significant extent 
an outcome of past high rates of population growth and widespread poverty. 
Failure to significantly reduce population growth rates in the region within the 
next 20 years will render all other development efforts insufficient to avoid future 
famines, poverty, and human misery of a much greater magnitude than seen in 
the region so far. 
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Figure 26Wheat production, area, and prices in Saudi Arabia, 1966-93 
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Source: USDA, 1993. 
Figure 27-Annual population growth, 1980-2000 
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Figure 28-Projected increase in urban and rural populations, 1980-2000 
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Source: United Nations, 1993. 
The high rates of increase in the urban population in the Third World will 
place severe pressures on the food marketing system including transportation, 
storage, processing, grading, and market information. In many developing 
countries, notably those of Sub-Saharan Africa, massive investments in physical 
infrastructure in both rural and urban areas will be needed to support the 
feeding of the urban population. Current efforts undertaken as part of economic 
reforms in many African countries to strengthen efficiency and competition in 
agricultural marketing through ‘the private sector must be enhanced and the 
appropriate role of government must be identified. 
Urbanization will accelerate the dietary transition associated with 
increasing incomes. Increasing opportunity cost of women’s time; changes in 
preferences caused by promotion, advertisement, and changing lifestyles; and 
changes in relative prices associated with rural to urban migration will change 
food demand from basic staples such as sorghum, millet, maize, and root crops 
to cereals such as wheat and rice (which require less preparation time), fruits, 
foods of animal origin, sugar, and processed foods. Rapid increases in the 
demand for livestock products will have severe repercussions on the demand 
for cereals as already discussed. 
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Figure 29-Percent of Population Living in Urban Areas, 1960, 1980, and 2000. 
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Source: United Nations, 1993. 
Rural Infrastructure, Agricultural Production Technology, and Access to 
Modern Inputs 
The importance of investments in rural infrastructure within the context 
of rapid urbanization was discussed above. However, even in the absence of 
rapid urban growth, such investments would be needed in many developing 
countries, particularly the poorest ones, to facilitate agricultural and rural 
development. Improved rural infrastructure enhances access to export markets, 
modern production inputs, and consumer goods. It reduces marketing costs, 
promotes exchange among intra-country markets, reduces spatial and temporal 
price distortions, and, in general, increases efficiency in production and 
marketing. 
However, while essential, effective rural infrastructure is not sufficient to 
assure agricultural and rural development and rapid increases in food 
production in developing countries. Yield-enhancing production technology is 
of critical importance. Although opportunities for expansion of agricultural 
production into lands not currently under cultivation still exist in some countries, 
such opportunities are very limited and would probably not be able to counter 
losses of current agricultural lands to alternative uses on a global level. 
Furthermore, attempts to expand agricultural production into new lands would, 
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in most cases, require very large investments and increase the risk of land 
degradation. Thus, future increases in food production must come primarily 
from higher yields per unit of land rather than land expansions. 
Agricultural research has successfully developed yield-enhancing 
technology for the majority of crops grown in temperate zones and for several 
crops grown in tropical zones. The dramatic impact of agricultural research and 
modern technology on wheat and rice yields in Asia and Latin America since 
the mid-1960s is well known and was illustrated earlier. Less dramatic but very 
significant yield gains have been obtained from research and technological 
change in other crops, particularly maize. Large yield gains currently being 
obtained in many crops at the experimental level offer great promise for future 
yield and production increases at the farm level. In addition to affecting yield 
levels, research resulting in tolerance or resistance to adverse production 
factors such as pests and drought and research on new varieties and hybrids 
better suited for various ecological conditions reduce risks and uncertainty and 
enhance sustainability in production through better management of natural 
resources and reduced environmental risks (through reduced use of chemical 
pesticides and avoidance of irreversible land degradation). 
Even if the positive impact on sustainability and natural resource 
management is ignored, investment in national and international agricultural 
research has been shown to produce large economic gains relative to costs 
(Tables 7 and 8). The distribution of economic gains among groups in society 
varies among countries and over time, depending on a number of issues related 
to markets, institutions, and policies. Gains captured by producers and 
agricultural workers contribute to employment, growth, and investment in 
agriculture and rural areas both directly and indirectly through growth linkages, 
while gains captured by consumers enhance purchasing power and facilitate 
employment and economic growth through lower wages and increased demand 
for goods and services. Depending on the structure of the economy, poverty 
alleviation in both rural and urban areas would be expected to result. 
Accelerated investment in agricultural research and technological 
improvements is not only necessary and urgent, it is the only viable option to 
assure sufficient food to meet future needs and demands at reasonable prices 
without irreversible degradation of our natural resources. While the large past 
and current economic benefits from agricultural research reflect traditional 
research methods, the recent development of biotechnological methods is likely 
to accelerate the research process, i.e. reduce the time needed between 
initiation of research and expected impact, and greatly enhance the 
opportunities for improved and higher-yielding plants and animals. 
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Table 7-Annual rates of return to agricultural research (percent of programs analyzed) 
Region Less Than 10% RR More Than 50% RR 
Africa 20 40 
Asia 3 63 
Latin America 7 46 
Source: Evenson and Rosegrant, 1993. 
Table a-Annual rates of return to agricultural research (percent of programs analyzed) 
Commoditv Less Than 10% RR More Than 50% RR 
Wheat 7 43 
Rice 0 68 
Maize 0 31 
Other commodity programs 12 53 
Aggregate research programs 1 62 
Source: Evenson and Rosegrant, 1993. 
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The significance of land scarcity was emphasized above. Water is 
another natural resource becoming increasing scarce in many production 
environments. Efforts to meet future food needs and demands while promoting 
sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation, including agricultural 
research and government policy, must pay increasing attention to the efficiency 
of water use, sustainability of water management practices, and investment in 
establishing and maintaining irrigation facilities. 
Last, but not least, access by farmers to modern inputs such as improved 
livestock, crop varieties and hybrids, fertilizers, and pest control measures, as 
well as credit, technical assistance, and improved farm management practices 
are essential components of a successful strategy to meet food production and 
development goals. Efforts to enhance farmers’ access to modern inputs must 
recognize the role of women in farming and marketing and design the programs 
accordingly. 
Natural Resource Management and Environmental Considerations 
The recent surge in public and private concerns about negative 
environmental effects of economic growth and development may, if sustained, 
have important implications for agricultural development and future food 
production and consumption. Of particular concern is the need to avoid 
degradation of natural resources such as land and water, as well as 
deforestation, water contamination, and health risks associated with the use of 
chemicals. Since most of the current and potential future resource degradation 
and environmental contamination result from externalities, neither the market nor 
the individual producers and consumers are likely to incorporate the necessary 
preventive measures into their behavior. Only when sufficient damage has been 
done to significantly influence current or future production costs will market and 
producer behavior change. Preventive measures are likely to come from either 
publicly funded research and technology development or government policy 
and regulations. Extensive waterlogging, salination, and associated land 
degradation and productivity losses resulting from inappropriate water 
management are of particular concern in large parts of Asia. 
In developing countries, poverty, rapid population growth, low agricultural 
productivity, and poorly defined ownership and user rights to resources are the 
major risk factors associated with the degradation of natural resources. 
Attempts to survive or to meet basic needs in the short run take priority over 
longer-term sustainability. Rural poverty combined with low yield capacity of 
crops and livestock and poorly defined land ownership lead to unsustainable 
exploitation of fragile lands, including those with low rainfall. Where land is 
scarce and population pressures are strong, deforestation is an appealing 
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solution to poor rural households to mitigate short-run food and income 
shortfalls. However, the ultimate consequences are likely to be reduced forest 
land, associated soil erosion, changing rainfall patterns, and general reductions 
in the productive capacity of the land. 
Yield-enhancing agricultural technology is the most promising avenue to 
sustainable agricultural production. Higher yields on less fragile lands will 
reduce the pressure on fragile lands and, together with better definition and 
distribution of land ownership and user rights, will reduce deforestation and 
desertification. Agricultural research and technology can facilitate production 
methods on both fragile and less fragile lands that will maintain land quality and 
productivity over time. Furthermore, appropriate agricultural technology and 
production practices for drought-prone areas may buffer the negative effects of 
low and variable rainfall on food security in addition to reversing current trends 
of land degradation. 
Agricultural research has already made great progress on making plants 
more tolerant or resistant to various pests and on biological pest control, thus 
reducing the need for chemicals in pest control. The efficiency of chemical pest 
control methods has been greatly increased, resulting in reduced contamination 
and personal safety risk. Accelerated research could further reduce the 
dependence on chemical pest control and thus reduce the risk of contamination 
of food, water, and air. 
As population, poverty, and food demand continue to grow, failure to 
develop and implement appropriate technology in production and marketing will 
lead either to more food insecurity and hunger, for which the current generation 
of poor people will pay, or to further degradation of our natural resources, for 
which future generations will pay. The trade-off between meeting future food 
demands and maintaining production capacity can be avoided and sustainability 
in food production can be assured only if (1) investment in appropriate research 
and technology is accelerated; (2) relevant externalities, including those related 
to resource ownership and user rights and the needs of future generations, are 
either internalized into production and consumption decisions or effectively dealt 
with by government policy; and (3) poverty is significantly reduced or 
eradicated. 
In view of the large risk of accelerated irreversible degradation of our 
natural resources and the urgent need to assure sustainable agricultural 
production to meet future food demands, it is difficult to understand why 
investment in the most promising solution, agricultural research and technology, 
appears to be decreasing. While government policy and regulations are 
essential to assure compatibility between production and environmental goals, 
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they will have only limited success unless accompanied by appropriate 
technology. 
CONCLUSIONS 
International support to developing-country agriculture including research 
and technology has been declining since the early 1980s. This trend appears 
to reflect complacency among OECD countries regarding the food and 
agriculture situation in developing countries. Is such complacency warranted? 
International real food prices’continued their long-term decreasing trend 
during the 1980s and early 199Os, food surpluses continue to be of concern to 
the European Economic Community and the United States, and there is reason 
to believe that the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will expand food 
production and possibly reduce food consumption during the next 10 years and 
perhaps even beyond. Yields of wheat, rice, and maize continue to increase in 
Asia and parts of Latin America, and a few African countries have shown their 
ability to rapidly expand food production in response to favorable policies and 
technologies. World stocks of cereals are at a level of about 300 million tons 
or 19 percent of annual consumption. Although lower than the mid-1980s, this 
is considerably higher than the levels immediately prior to the food crisis of the 
early 1970s (Figure 30). All together reasons for complacency. But 
unfortunately, such complacency is grossly inappropriate. 
Population growth will outstrip growth in food production in Sub-Saharan 
Africa for a long time to come, unless much more is done to accelerate 
agricultural growth. Between now and the year 2000, the population will grow 
at more than 3 percent per year while food production is likely to grow at 2 
percent or less per year. By the year 2000, the production shortfall is estimated 
to increase to about 50 million tons of grain equivalent, up from the current level 
of about 14 million tons (von Braun and Paulino 1990). It is extremely unlikely 
that the region will have the necessary foreign exchange to import such large 
amounts of food. It is equally unlikely that African governments will be able to 
count on enough food aid to make up the difference. If current trends continue, 
the World Bank estimates that by the year 2020, Africa will’have a food shortage 
of 250 million tons, which is more than 20 times the current food gap. 
Asian food demand is estimated to grow at an annual rate of 2 percent 
between now and the year 2000, whereas food production is estimated to grow 
at 1.3 percent per year. Much of the production shortfall is likely to be dealt 
with through expanded imports and perhaps through expanded regional 
production in response to price increases. 
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Figure 30-World stock levels of grains, 1972-l 992 
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In Latin America, by contrast, growth in food production is anticipated to 
exceed food demand growth: food production is estimated to grow by 3 percent 
annually between 1990 and the year 2000, while food demand is estimated to 
grow by 2.5 percent per year. 
About 700 million people are food insecure; for them the food crisis has 
arrived. For the 10 to 12 million preschool children who died last year from 
hunger and diseases of hunger and malnutrition, the food crisis came and went. 
One-third of the preschool children of the Third World were unable to grow to 
the full potential. Growth faltering is associated with high morbidity and 
mortality risks. While small may be beautiful, the process leading to smallness 
is not. 
The food security prospects for Sub-Saharan Africa are particularly 
worrisome. Poverty is expected to increase rapidly in the coming years and 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of the world’s poor is expected to double from the 
current 16 percent to about 33 percent in the year 2000. Furthermore, the 
number of underweight children is expected to increase in the 1990s in Sub- 
Saharan Africa even under the most optimistic assumptions made by the United 
Nations. 
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Large extensions of land are degraded and the degradation continues at 
a rapid rate. High rates of deforestation continue and the principal reasons for 
environmental degradation: poverty, high population growth, and limited access 
to appropriate agricultural technology are not being effectively dealt with. 
Complacency is not in order. Clearly, Malthus underestimated the power 
of science to expand food production. The mass starvation that was predicted 
to occur in Asia in the 1970s and 1980s did not materialize because science 
was effectively put to work to expand crop yields. However, past yield 
increases came about because people with foresight made appropriate 
decisions. Failure to expand investments in agricultural research and 
technology development during the 1980s and early 1990s indicate that such 
foresight no longer prevails. Given the long lag time between investment in 
agricultural research and the resulting production increases, failure to invest 
today will show up in production shortfalls and environmental degradation 10 
to 20 years from now. We must not wait until a global food crisis is upon us or 
until the last tree has fallen before making these investments. Much of the 
action needed has been delineated by a number of FAO conferences and 
publications, by the UNCED conference and Agenda 21, the International 
Conference on Nutrition, and the World Summit for Children. The upcoming 
International Population Conference, FAO’s 50th Anniversary Conference, and 
IFPRl’s new initiative for a 20-20 Vision on Food, Agriculture, and the 
Environment will further add building blocks to the development of a common 
vision for food, agriculture, and the environment, and a consensus for action to 
bring about such a vision. 
Failure to act may prove Malthus right. 
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